The German-Soviet pact, signed in August 1939, paved the way for the invasion and joint occupation of Poland in September. By signing the agreement, Hitler avoided the threat of a great war on two fronts. Stalin was then allowed to extend the Soviet regime to the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and parts of Romania and Finland. The pact was an agreement of convenience between the two bitter ideological enemies. It allowed Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union to dismember spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, when they did not want to attack each other for ten years. Less than two years later, however, Hitler launched an invasion of the Soviet Union. The projects were officially presented at the end of May.  The main tripartite negotiations began in mid-June.  Discussions focused on possible guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe in the event of German aggression.
 The Soviets proposed that a political shift by the Baltic States to Germany would constitute an “indirect aggression” against the Soviet Union.  Britain rejected such proposals because they feared that the language proposed by the Soviets would justify Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states, or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany.   The debate over a definition of “indirect aggression” became one of the sticking points between the parties and, in mid-July, tripartite political negotiations were virtually heated, while the parties agreed to begin negotiations on a military agreement that the Soviets insisted could be reached at the same time as a political agreement.  On the eve of the start of the military negotiations, the Soviet Politburo pessimistically expected that the forthen negotiations would be in vain and formally decided to seriously consider the German proposals.  Military negotiations began on 12 August in Moscow with a British delegation led by retired Admiral Sir Reginald Drax, the French delegation led by General Aimé Doumenc and the Soviet delegation led by Defence Commissioner Kliment Voroshilov and Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov. In the absence of written certifications, Drax did not have the power to guarantee anything to the Soviet Union and the British government ordered it to extend the talks for as long as possible and avoid the question of whether Poland would allow Soviet troops to enter the country if the Germans invaded the country.  When negotiations failed, a great chance to prevent German aggression was probably lost.  Soviet and contemporary Russian history tends to emphasize the fact that the occupation of Czechoslovakia gave Hitler support for the invasion of Poland, where the starting position was acquired for further attacks against the USSR. She completely ignores the fact that it was not Munich that freed the bonds from Hitler`s hands to invade Poland, but his agreement with Stalin on August 23, 1939. Before Germany and the USSR divided Poland, Germany had no common border with the USSR! At the same time, in August 1939, British, French and Soviet negotiators were planning tripartite talks in Moscow on military issues to define what the agreement on the three powers` reaction to a German attack would define.  The tripartite military talks, which began in mid-August, reached a sensitive point in the passage of Soviet troops through Poland, when Germans were attacking, and the parties were waiting when British and French overseas officials urged Polish officials to accept such conditions.
  Polish officials refused to allow Soviet troops into Polish territory if Germany attacked; Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck stressed that the Polish government feared that the Red Army would never leave if it had Polish territory.   The Soviet Union had not been able to conclude a collective agreement with Great Britain and France against Nazi Germany, notably at the Munich conference in