In the United States, executive agreements are made exclusively by the President of the United States. They are one of three mechanisms through which the United States makes binding international commitments. Some authors view executive agreements as treaties of international law because they bind both the United States and another sovereign state. However, under U.S. constitutional law, executive agreements are not considered treaties within the meaning of the contractual clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the Council and the approval of two-thirds of the Senate to be considered a treaty. [Footnote 447] The decision made at Ladies and Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), is rich in learning on many topics with executive agreements, but the Court`s conclusion that Congress had either authorized various presidential actions or long accepted in others, leaves the case to little to our specific question of this section. It was also at this time that John Hay, as McKinley`s foreign minister, initiated his “open door” policy with notes to Britain, Germany and Russia, which were quickly followed by notes similar to those of France, Italy and Japan.
They essentially asked the beneficiaries to formally declare that they would not seek to expand their respective interests in China at the expense of one of the others; And everyone reacted positively. In 427-05, the first Roosevelt, seeking a diplomatic agreement with Japan, engaged in an exchange of views between the then Minister of War, Taft, then in the Far East, and Count Katsura, who amounted to a secret contract by which the Roosevelt administration undertook to establish a military protectorate in Korea by Japan. 428 Three years later, Foreign Minister Root and Japan`s Ambassador to Washington concluded the Root Takahira Agreement to maintain the status quo in the Pacific and maintain the principle of equal opportunities for trade and industry in China. 429 In 1907, the Mikado government agreed in 1907, through a “gentleman`s agreement,” to stem the emigration of Japanese subjects to the United States, thereby allerging the Washington government from the need to take measures that would have cost the loss of Japan`s face. The end result of this series of executive agreements affecting U.S. relations in the Far East and the Far East was the result of President Wilson`s diplomacy. This was the Lansing Ishii Agreement, enshrined in an exchange of letters of November 2, 1917, in which the United States recognized Japan`s “special interests” in China and Japan endorsed the open door principle in that country. 430 The executive`s purported intention to make full use of executive agreements in the implementation of post-war colonies was repeatedly cited during the Senate debate during the 1943 session of Congress. “We are told,” said Senator O`Mahoney (D., Wyo.) during the debate on the prorogation of the Trade Agreements Act, that there will be no need to end this war with a peace treaty. During the Panama Claims Agreement debate, Senator Clark (D., Mo.) stated that “there is no intention to present to Congress the terms of the peace settlement.” It is planned to agree the terms of peace by an executive agreement, “subject to the agreement of the President.” According to Senator Taft (R., O.): “The Constitution wisely provides that treaties must be approved by the Senate, but increasingly the president will whip this provision of the Constitution.” The implementation of executive agreements increased considerably after 1939.